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Does the current legal framework adequately encourage ships to
try to protect other ships from a danger that, if realized, could result
in the spillage of oil or other hazardous chemicals? This paper looks
at the existing laws, treaties, and standard contracts that affect a ship
owner's decision whether to attempt to salvage another vessel that is
imperiled and at risk of spilling oil or other chemicals into the water.
The specific legal issue is whether a salvage awards should reward
salvagers for preventing the owner's property from causing envi-
ronmental damage, at least when the owner would have been liable
for such damage, had it occurred. This paper focuses on environ-
mental salvage under American laws and treaties, and under Lloyd's
Open Form agreements (which are governed by English law. Since
these agreements are made in most contemporary salvage operations
involving American interests, they are critically important to this
discussion.)
To understand environmental salvage law, one must be familiar
with the concept of liability salvage. Our discussion of liability sal-
vage, however, requires a preliminary discussion of the fundamental
principles of American salvage law. Accordingly, the first section of
this paper begins with a summary of the fundamentals of traditional
salvage law. Next, it examines several 19th century statutes that can
limit the liability of shipowners, and then two important environ-
mental laws that can give rise to liabilities that cannot be limited by
those laws.
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2009; Senior Notes
and Comments Editor of the Environmental Law Review, 2008-2009. This note is
based on a term paper written for Admiralty and International Maritime Law in
2007. The author is especially grateful for the advice and support of Joseph
Sweeney and Howard M. McCormack, the professors who taught the course.
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Then, this paper looks at how the more recent Lloyd's Open Form
agreements have given environmental salvagers some incentive to
avert environmental liabilities, and evaluate whether those incentives
are sufficient. It will examine some modem cases that have dealt
with the related question of whether liability salvage should be rec-
ognized. Finally, this paper tries to answer the question of how envi-
ronmental salvage awards might be computed.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
A. Traditional Salvage Law
Maritime commerce, since ancient times, has been critical to the
success and prosperity of peoples and nations. Seagoing vessels,
whether built for trade or for war, have always been very expensive
to construct and properly maintain. And while modem technology
makes it easier for ships to avoid storms, our brightest scientists are
scarcely better than the soothsayers of yore at predicting where the
next big storm will arise. Then, as now, the safety of ships is all too
often put into the grave dangers created by Mother Nature, and the
errors of men. It is not surprising then, that maritime law has an an-
cient tradition of rewarding the owners, crews, and officers of ships
that successfully rescue the property others from the destructive and
unpredictable dangers associated with maritime activities. But com-
puting such rewards is often far more difficult than the determination
that the owner owes something to the salvager.
In Blackwall l the Supreme Court explained many of the funda-
mentals of American salvage law. A salvager will not receive an
award absent: (1) the presence of a maritime peril that threatens
property with loss, destruction, or deterioration; (2) the provision of
voluntarily rendered2 salvaging services (in other words, the sal-
vager cannot receive a salvage award if he had a pre-existing legal
duty to provide the services, as he might under a contract); and (3)
the successful recovery or protection of the threatened property.
3
1. Blackwall, 77 U.S. 1 (1869).
2. Sabine, 101 U.S. 384 (1879).
3. Id.; see also Thomas Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law, 2 Admi-
ralty & Mar. Law § 16-1 (4th ed.) (noting that the property can be something as
simple as an unattended log adrift in navigable waters. See Whitmire v. Cobb, 88
F. 91 (5th Cir. 1898); Bywater v. A Raft of Piles, 42 F. 917 (D. Wash. 1890).
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Also, a salvager will not receive an award if the owner (or his agent,)
acting prudently, communicates a refusal to the salvager before he
saves the property.4
The third requirement is often expressed through the phrase "no
cure-no pay," which has long been an important and defining charac-
teristic of both American and British salvage law.5 The law does not
reward failed or partially successful salvage attempts,6 but a salvager
who successfully saves some of the property can still receive an
award for it, based on its post-salvage value. (If a fire causes $45
million in damages to a $50 million yacht before a salvager success-
fully puts it out, the salvager has successfully protected $5 million of
the owner's property. The $45 million loss does not generally preju-
dice the salvager with respect to an award for the value he did pro-
tect.) Of course, the salvager and prospective salvagee can, by con-
tract, agree to a specific amount of compensation.
In Blackwall, the Supreme Court not only explained the require-
ments of a valid salvage claim, it also discussed the purpose of sal-
vage awards and the factors courts use in fixing their amounts. The
award for "pure" salvages is not based on contract law,7 and it is
also not considered a quantum meruit type of payment for the value
of the service rendered. 8 Instead, salvage awards are meant to en-
courage "seamen and others to embark in such undertakings to save
4. Tidewater Salvage, Inc. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 633 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir.
1980) (holding that a salvager cannot receive a salvage award for saving property
if, before commencing the salvage, he knew that the property belonged to an
owner who did not want him to salvage the property and that such refusal was not
imprudent); but see Merritt & Chapman Derrick & Wrecking Co. v. U.S., 274 U.S.
611, 613 (1927) (stating that if no reasonable person would have refused the sal-
vager's help, the law will disregard the refusal).
5. Martin J. Norris, Benedict on Admiralty: The Law of Salvage § 159, at 12-
1 to 12-3 (1997).
6. Blackwall.
7. Indeed, if the salvager has a contractual obligation to attempt the salvage,
it is his legal duty to do so. The contract compels his action, it is not voluntary.
See W. Coast Shipping Brokers Corp. v. Ferry "Chuchequero", 582 F.2d 959, 960
(5th Cir. 1978).
8. Blackwall, 77 U.S. at 14 (stating that "[c]ompensation as salvage is not
viewed by the admiralty courts merely as pay, on the principle of a quantum me-
ruit, or as a remuneration PRO OPERE ET LABORE, but as a reward given for
perilous services, voluntarily rendered, and as an inducement to seamen and others
to embark in such undertakings to save life and property.").
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life9 and property."' 0 It also listed six factors that courts of admi-
ralty will "usually consider" the "main ingredients" in the computa-
tion of a salvager's award:
"(1) The labor expended by the salvors in rendering the
salvage service.
(2) The promptitude, skill, and energy displayed in ren-
dering the service and saving the property.
(3) The value of the property employed by the salvors in
rendering the service, and the danger to which such prop-
erty was exposed.
(4) The risk incurred by the salvors in securing the prop-
erty from the impending peril.
(5) The value of the property saved.
(6) The degree of danger from which the property was
rescued." 
1 1
The Supreme Court did not say that its list of factors was an ex-
haustive enumeration of the circumstances admiralty courts may
consider in computing all salvage awards. To the contrary, the Court
said that the factors were ones that courts "usually consider the fol-
lowing circumstances ... the main ingredients"' 12 (emphasis added)
of a salvage award. The Court seems to have recognized that in
other circumstances, some other factor or factors would be very im-
portant in setting the salvage award.
The Court in Blackwall awarded a moiety (half) of the value of the
salvaged property to the salvager, and said that the defendant ship-
owner would presumptively retain the other moiety. The Court left
open the possibility that the other salvaging party, a fire department,
could bring a successful salvage suit for the other moiety. (The
Court did not pass judgment on whether such a suit could succeed, it
merely stated that if the fire department did not seek a salvage re-
9. Despite the fact that Blackwall states that salvage awards are meant to
encourage the saving of lives at sea, courts have refused to allow salvage awards
for "pure life" salvages - salvages in which no property is saved, only human life.
However, when courts imply the existence of a maritime contract, the salvager
may be able to receive a quantum meruit award under quasi-contract theory. Pen-
insular & Oriental Steam Nav. Co. v. Overseas Oil Carriers, Inc., 553 F.2d 830,
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 859 (1977).
10. Blackwall, 77 U.S. at 14. See supra note 8.
11. Id. at 13, 14.
12. Id.
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ward, the shipowner would definitely be allowed to retain the other
half of the ship's value.) 13 The Second Circuit would later specu-
late, in dictum, that salvage awards should seldom be higher than a
moiety of the property salvaged, 14 and has subsequently halved at
least one district court's salvage award. 15 But the Fourth Circuit has
held that a moiety is neither a ceiling nor a floor on salvage
awards. 16
In salvage awards that are determined under Article 13 of the In-
ternational Convention on Salvage, 17 ("1989 Convention") the fac-
tors that courts consider are very similar to those mentioned in
Blackwall language, the phrasing of Article 13 seems to indicate that
13. Id. at 15 (stating that "we express no opinion whether the other moiety
may or may not be claimed by the fire department; but if not, then it enures to the
shipowners.").
14. High Cliff, 271 F. 202, 204 (2d Cir. 1921) (commenting that "[t]he highest
compensation ordinarily allowed in the most meritorious cases is one moiety,
which is rarely given except in the case of a derelict. While seldom more than
one-half or less than one-third is given there are many cases in which the award
has been under 5 per cent.").
15. W. E. Rippon & Son v. U. S., 348 F.2d 627, 630 (2d Cir. 1965) (holding
that as "[aldequate yardsticks are peculiarly lacking in determining salvage ... the
result reached by ... Solomon may well supply the guide." The Second Circuit
reduced the trial court's award by approximately half. It cited High Cliff, 271 F.
202, where it had previously halved a district court's salvage award.).
16. Columbus-Am. Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. (The Central
America 1) 56 F.3d 556 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 938 (1995) (hold-
ing that the so-called moiety rule, under which "a successful salvor, as a matter of
course [would be awarded] one-half of the imperiled goods salvaged from the
derelict vessel" did not constitute an upper limit on a salvager's award.). It should
be noted that this case dealt with a vessel that had sunk over a hundred years be-
fore the gold in its cargo was "salvaged." It can be reconciled with High Cliff, 271
F. 202, 204 because the salvage of the Central America was anything but an ordi-
nary case (stating that "[t]he highest compensation ordinarily allowed in the most
meritorious cases is one moiety") (italics added). The parties claiming to be the
owners of the cargo (gold) in Columbus-Am. Discovery Group included several
insurance companies and their successors; but apparently the documents that
might have proved their ownership had been lost or destroyed in the hundred plus
years since the Central America sank. The Fourth Circuit held that the salvager
could keep all of the gold, except whatever the underwriters could prove belonged
to them. It seems unlikely that the underwriters would be able to prove any con-
tinuing ownership interest without the documents that had long since been lost, so
the salvager probably received all of the gold. (Oddly, no descendents of any of
the passengers seem to have came forward demanding their relatives' gold.).
17. International Convention on Salvage, Art. 13, available at
http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/imo.salvage.convention. 1989/doc.html#6 1.
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courts must consider all of its factors, and only those factors. 18
There are two other significant differences between Article 13 of the
1989 Convention and Blackwall. Under the former, the salvor's
maximum award is clearly limited by the value of the salvaged prop-
erty,' 9 while the latter does not explicitly mention any ceiling on
salvage awards. 20  Another important difference is that the 1989
Convention's list of factors takes into account the efforts and skill of
the salvor in "preventing or minimizing" (emphasis added) environ-
mental damage.
2 1
18. Id. Article 13: Criteria for Fixing the Reward: (1) The reward shall be
fixed with a view to encouraging salvage operations, taking into account the fol-
lowing criteria without regard to the order in which they are presented below:
(a) the salved value of the vessel and other property; (b) the skill and efforts of the
salvors in preventing or minimizing damage to the environment; (c) the measure
of success obtained by the salvor; (d) the nature and degree of the danger; (e) the
skill and efforts of the salvors in salving the vessel, other property and life; (f) the
time used and expenses and losses incurred by the salvors; (g) the risk of liability
and other risks run by the salvors or their equipment; (h) the promptness of the
services rendered; (i) the availability and use of vessels or other equipment in-
tended for salvage operations; () the state of readiness and efficiency of the sal-
vor's equipment and the value thereof. (2) Payment of a reward fixed according to
paragraph 1 shall be made by all of the vessel and other property interests in pro-
portion to their respective salved values. (3) The rewards, exclusive of any interest
and recoverable legal costs that may be payable thereon, shall not exceed the
salved value of the vessel or other property.
19. Note that any interest or legal costs awarded pursuant to art. 13 are not
subject to this cap on awards. See id. at art. 13, (3). It is very important to note
that salvages under art. 14 are based on the "salvager's expenses," not the value of
the salvaged property. See id. at art. 14.
20. Blackwall, 77 U.S. 1 at 15; see supra, quoted text at note 13.
21. International Convention on Salvage, available at http://www.jus.uio.no/
ln/imo.salvage.convention.1989/doc.html#61. Article 14: Special Compensation:
(1) If the salvor has carried out salvage operations in respect of a vessel which by
itself or its cargo threatened damage to the environment and has failed to earn a
reward under article 13 at least equivalent to the special compensation assessable
in accordance with this article, he shall be entitled to special compensation from
the owner of that vessel equivalent to his expenses as herein defined. (2) If, in the
circumstances set out in paragraph 1, the salvor by his salvage operations has pre-
vented or minimized damage to the environment, the special compensation pay-
able by the owner to the salvor under paragraph 1 may be increased up to a maxi-
mum of 30% of the expenses incurred by the salvor. However, the tribunal, if it
deems it fair and just to do so and bearing in mind the relevant criteria set out in
article 13, paragraph 1, may increase such special compensation further, but in no
event shall the total increase be more than 100% of the expenses incurred by the
salvor. (3) Salvor's expenses for the purpose of paragraphs 1 and 2 means the out-
of-pocket expenses reasonably incurred by the salvor in the salvage operation and
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B. Limitation ofLiability
In 1848, the Supreme Court decided a case that significantly af-
fected American shipowners; The Lexington.22 It held that unless
the ship and cargo owners expressly agreed otherwise, the shipowner
insured the cargo's owner against any and all damages that the cargo
might suffer "in the course of the conveyance," except damages re-
sulting from "the act of God or the public enemy., 23 This prevented
shipowners from unilaterally restricting their liability for damage to
the cargo that their ships carried. In 1734, the Parliament of Great
Britain enacted a law to protect shipowners from being liable to
cargo owners for thefts by the ship's officers and crew24 and about
fifty years later it amended the law to provide more protection.
About thirty years after that, Parliament amended it to limit shi-
powner liability in collisions (including ones caused by negli-
gence).26 In 1819, the legislature of Massachusetts enacted a statute
limiting the liability of shipowners, 27 which was similar to the Eng-
lish Limitation Act as it was in 1786, as opposed to the more re-
cently amended 1813 version. 28 When Maine separated from Mas-
sachusetts and became an American State in 1820 (as per the Mis-
a fair rate for equipment and personnel actually and reasonably used in the salvage
operation, taking into consideration the criteria set out in article 13, paragraph 1
(h), (i) and (j). (4) The total special compensation under this article shall be paid
only if and to the extent that such compensation is greater than any reward recov-
erable by the salvor under article 13. (5) If the salvor has been negligent and has
thereby failed to prevent or minimize damage to the environment, he may be de-
prived of the whole or part of any special compensation due under this article. (6)
Nothing in this article shall affect any right of recourse on the part of the owner of
the vessel.
22. N.J. Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants' Bank of Boston (The Lexington)
47 U.S. 344 (1848).
23. Id. at 381.
24. See Joseph C. Sweeney, Limitation of Shipowner Liability: Its American
Roots and Some Problems Particular to Collision, 32 J. Mar. L. & Com. 241, 244
(2001) at note 17 (citing 7 Geo. 2 c. 15 (1734) and characterizing it as dealing with
"losses to shippers from theft by master or crew.").
25. Id. at 244, n. 18, (citing 26 Geo. 3 c. 86 (1786) and characterizing it as
being concerned with "loss by fire as well as theft by other than master or crew.").
26. Id. at 244, n. 20, 245, (citing An Act to Limit Responsibility of Ship Own-
ers in Certain Cases, 53 Ge. 3 c. 159 (1813)).
27. An Act to encourage Trade and Navigation within this Commonwealth,
1819 Mass. Acts 193.
28. Sweeney, supra note 24, at 245, n. 24.
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souri Compromise) it passed its own act to limit shipowner liability
soon after, in 1821.29
In 1851, Senator Hannibal Hamlin of Maine (who would later be-
come the first vice president of the first Republican president, Abra-
ham Lincoln) 30 introduced a bill to respond to The Lexington, and
supersede its rule that shipowners are the insurers of their ships'
cargo; and to give American shipowners a similar level of protection
against liabilities to that enjoyed by their British and Dutch competi-
tors. 31 He successfully marshaled enough Congressional support for
it to become law, (it is commonly referred to as the Limitation of
Liability Act,) one which has been amended, but not repealed.32 In
its current form, it limits the liabilities of shipowners to their owner-
ship interest the ship, (plus any freight she has on board,) with re-
gards to any liability involving the ship; generally subject to two
exceptions. 3
If the liability is for personal injury or death, and the owner's in-
terest in the ship is not enough to satisfy that liability, he can be held
liable for an additional $420 per gross ton 34 of the vessel (unless the
vessel is a pleasure yacht, tug, towboat, towing vessel, tank vessel,
fishing vessel or the tender of such, a self-propelled lighter, a nonde-
script self-propelled vessel, a canal boat, scow, car float, barge,
lighter or a nondescript non-self-propelled vessel.) 35  The second
general exception is that the act does not limit liabilities that oc-
curred with the "privity or knowledge ' 36 of the owner or owners.37
29. An Act respecting the willful destruction and casting away of ships and
cargoes; the custody of shipwrecked goods, and trade and navigation, 1821 Me.
Laws 78, §§ 8-10, revised in 1840, 1857 and 1930.
30. Supra note 24, at 241, n. 2.
31. Id. at 244, 255-56.
32. Act of March 3, 1851, ch. 43, 9 Stat. 635, Rev. Stat. §§ 4282-4290, as
amended.
33. 46. U.S.C.A. App. § 183 (Stating that "(a) The liability of the owner of any
vessel, whether American or foreign, for any embezzlement, loss, or destruction
by any person of any property, goods, or merchandise shipped or put on board of
such vessel, or for any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or for any act, matter,
or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred, without the
privity or knowledge of such owner or owners, shall not, except in the cases pro-
vided for in subsection (b) of this section, exceed the amount or value of the inter-
est of such owner in such vessel, and her freight then pending.").
34. See id. at (c), (f).
35. See id. at (b)-(f).
36. "Privity or knowledge" is distinct from the legal doctrine of respondeat
superior. It "is a single term that identifies the personal fault that law or contract
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Of course, Congress can also create causes of action through new
statutes and specify that the Limitation of Liability Act does not ap-
ply to liability arising under those statutes.
Many of the biggest claims made against shipowners are made by
the owners of the ship's cargo. So perhaps it is not especially sur-
prising that Congress also passed other statutes that allow shipown-
ers to limit their liabilities to cargo owners. While the Limitation of
Liability Act can limit shipowners' liability to cargo owners, these
other statutes can apply in situations where the Limitation of Liabil-
ity Act does not. These federal statutes38 are the Harter Act, 39 the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,40 and the Fire Statute.
41
But much has changed since the time the Limitation of Liability
Act was signed into law. In the 20th century, one can set up a sepa-
rate limited liability corporation for each ship one owns - admiralty
law will usually only subject the immediate corporate owner to
unlimited liability42 (therefore, the umbrella company's liability with
respect to any one ship is generally limited by the value of the sub-
sidiary company that directly owns that particular ship.) Also, mod-
em P & I clubs provide relatively inexpensive insurance to shipown-
ers; almost all oceangoing ships today have coverage from them.
In light of these modem protections available to shipowners, it
may be time for Congress to give the Limitation of Liability Act a
burial at sea. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals felt that it was very
outdated and unfair, and that it ought to be construed narrowly.
43
Four justices of the Supreme Court also criticized the Limitation of
Liability Act as being unjust to injured seamen and contrary to the
modem way that Congress subsidizes industries (by giving them
fastens upon the shipowner, as distinguished from" respondeat superior. Nicholas
J. Healy, et al, Cases and Material on Admiralty, 848-49 (4th ed. 2006).
37. 46 U.S.C.A. App. § 183, supra note 33, at (a).
38. Healy, supra note 36, at 842.
39. The Harter Act, 46 App. U.S.C.A. §§ 190-96.
40. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 App. U.S.C.A. §§ 1300 et seq.
41. The Fire Statute, 46 U.S.C.A. App. § 182.
42. See Kilkenny v. Arco Marine Inc., 800 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying
the same corporate veil piercing / alter ego test used in non-maritime cases).
43. Continental Oil Co. v. Bonanza Corp., 706 F.2d 1365, 1376 (5th Cir.1983)
(en banc); University of Texas Medical Branch v. United States, 557 F.2d 438,
441 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820, 99 S.Ct. 84, 58 L.Ed.2d 111
(1978).
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public funds and/or tax breaks). 44 It is important to note that these
dissenting justices believed the Limitation of Liability Act was out-
dated over half a century ago, as Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing
was decided in 1954. Contemporary legal scholars continue to criti-
cize the statute as being unfair and unjustifiable in the modem world,
even if it might have been desirable when it was enacted.45
C. Relevant Federal Environmental Statutes (of the United States)
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act 46 ("CERCLA")
There are many provisions in the CERCLA; the ones relevant to
this discussion hold entities that release or threatened release of
"hazardous substances" (the definition of which is provided infra)
strictly liable 47 for the government's costs in removing them. Addi-
tionally, they hold such individuals strictly liable for pollution dam-
age to natural resources, the reasonable costs of estimating those
damages, the costs of health assessments to determine the health ef-
fects of the pollution, and interest that accrues on those costs.
48
44. Md. Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 427, 74 S. Ct. 608, 623 (1954)
(Black, J., dissenting) ("Judicial expansion of the Limit[ation of] Liability Act at
this date seems especially inappropriate. Many of the conditions in the shipping
industry which induced the 1851 Congress to pass the Act no longer prevail .... If
shipowners really needed an additional subsidy, Congress can give it to them
without making injured seamen bear the cost.").
45. See Sweeney, supra note 24 at 277 ("While the dismal science of econom-
ics may have provided the justification for the original enactment of the Limitation
of Liability Act, at a time when insurances were primitive and vessel owners knew
nothing about their investments for months at a time, protections available to the
shipping industry are far greater today, so natural law and justice cry out against
preserving investors at the expense of innocent victims.").
46. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (2002) [hereinafter CERCLA]. But see Reardon v.
U.S., 947 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that provisions of § 9607 that pur-
portedly allowed the government to secure liens against property without requiring
that the government first provide the property's owner with notice and a pre-
deprivation hearing were unconstitutional. However, the rest of CERCLA was left
intact - the overruled portion is not relevant to the subject matter of this paper.).
47. There are several defenses available to defendants, which are discussed
infra. However, they are so difficult to establish that CERCLA's standard, in the
view of the author, is one of strict liability.
48. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607.
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The CERCLA only applies to materials that are within its defini-
tion of "hazardous substances." Hazardous substances do not in-
clude petroleum or fractional components of crude oil crude except
for components of crude oil that have been specifically listed or des-
ignated under subparagraphs (A)-(F) of paragraph 14 of 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 9601 .49 Also, "the term [hazardous substances] does not include
natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas
usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas.) 50
The CERCLA specifies that no defenses apply against it, except
those defenses it specifically enumerates (which are complete de-
fenses.) The three defenses require that the defendant establish (by a
preponderance of the evidence) that the pollution's release or threat-
ened release was solely caused by: an act of God, an act of war, or
the act of a third party (or a combination of the three.)51
However, to make a "solely caused by a third party" defense, the
defendant must establish that: (1) the third party was not his em-
ployee or agent, (2) the third party's action or omission was not in
connection with a direct or indirect contractual relationship with
him, (or if the act or omission was in connection with a direct or in-
direct contractual relationship between the defendant and the third
party, that it was the sole contractual arrangement, that it was be-
tween the defendant and a common carrier by rail, and the contract
arose from a published tariff), and (3) by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, the defendant took due care in light of all the facts and cir-
cumstances (including the characteristics of the substance), and that
he took precautions against the foreseeable acts and omissions of the
52third party and their foreseeable consequences. These defenses are
not easily made.
The Limitation of Liability Act does not apply to CERCLA liabili-
ties, only special CERCLA liability caps do. 5 Two of these liability
caps relate to ships (except "incineration vessels," whose damages
are capped at the "costs of response" plus $50 million.) The liability
cap for ships with no hazardous substances as cargo or residue is the
greater of $300 per gross ton of the vessel, or $500,000. If the vessel
49. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 at 14.
50. Id.
51. Id. at (b). See also Id. at (h) (explicitly stating that its liability will be im-
posed "notwithstanding any provision of the Act of March 3, 1851." This refers to
the Limitation of Liability Act.).
52. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607 (b), (h).
53. Id. at (c).
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has any hazardous substance as cargo or residue, the damage cap is
the greater of $300 per gross ton of the vessel or $5 million.
However, the CERCLA's liability caps are not automatically ap-
plied. They do not apply when: the release or threatened release of
the hazardous substance was "the result of willful misconduct or
willful negligence within the privity of knowledge" of the owner or
operator ("willful negligence" seems to be an oxymoronic term; but
it might mean "gross negligence,") or, if the primary cause of the
release or threatened release of the hazardous substance was a viola-
tion of the applicable (federal) safety, construction or operating stan-
dards or regulations (within the privity or knowledge of the owner or
operator;) or if the owner or operator has failed to provide all rea-
sonable assistance and cooperation requested by the responsible
government official.55 If the owner or operator is asked by the
President to remove or remediate the hazardous substance and "fails
without sufficient cause," he can also be held liable for punitive
damages, ranging from one to three times the EPA's costs incurred
as a result of the failure.5 6
2. Oil Pollution Act of 199017 ("OPA 90")
The Torrey Canyon, completed in 1959, was once the largest ship
of her day. Unfortunately, in 1967 she set a different world record -
for the most barrels of crude oil spilled (120,000 tons.) 58 An even
worse oil spill was caused by the Amoco Cadiz in 1978. 59  The
Amoco Cadiz was a 1,095 feet long, 167 feet wide supertanker carry-
ing approximately 220,000 tons of Iranian crude oil when she broke
apart off the coast of Brittany, France. Most of her cargo was
spilled, and approximately 180 miles of Brittany's shorelines were
contaminated. The crude oil damaged Brittany's beaches, which had
been a very popular tourist destination, and numerous oyster and
lobster beds were also ruined. France estimated that its damages
were about $100 million (in 1978 dollars.) 60
54. Id. at (c) (1).
55. Id. at (c) (2).
56. Id. at (c) (3).
57. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2761.
58. See Esta Lata Charters, Inc., v. Ignacio, 875 F.2d 234, 239, n. 10 (9th Cir.
1989).
59. In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz Off the Coast of France on March 16,
1978, 794 F.Supp. 261 (N. D. IL 1992); aff'd, 4 F.3d 997 (7th Cir. 1993).
60. Id.
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Throughout the 1960's, 70's, and 80's, there were numerous other
major oil spills involving oil tankers. But to the average American,
the most infamous oil spill was the one caused by the Exxon Valdez
in the Prince William Sound in 1989. While en route from Alaska to
California, the Exxon Valdez crashed into the Bligh Reef, breaching
her hull.61 Fortunately she was not carrying a full load, but she still
managed to spill about 11 million gallons of crude oil into the Prince
William Sound, contaminating its waters and nearby shores. The
accident was the subject of extensive litigation, some of which has
only recently been resolved, 62 and some of which is still pending -
the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in one lawsuit related to the
incident.63 The accident caused Exxon to incur billions of dollars in
liability and greatly increased the public's awareness of the envi-
ronmental dangers posed by oil spills.
Perhaps the public's outcry over the Exxon Valdez oil spill made
Congress more willing to make the compromises necessary to pass
OPA 90. The main disagreement, which delayed the bill's passage
for years, was whether to include a provision that would allow states
to exclude its effects within their waters. Currently, OPA 90xempts
from its coverage any discharge of oil "permitted by a permit issued
under Federal, State, or local law."
64
OPA 90 defines oil as "oil of any kind or in any form, including
petroleum, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse, and oil mixed with wastes
other than dredged spoil" but not anything considered a "hazardous
substance" under the CERCLA.65 Thus, CERCLA and OPA 90 are
mutually exclusive with regards to any given substance. Within the
context of these two laws, something that is an "oil" is not a "haz-
ardous substance," and vice versa. (Of course, if a vessel spilled
"oil" and a "hazardous substance," both CERCLA and OPA 90
could apply.) Note that even vegetable oil and animal oils are con-
sidered "oil" under OPA 90; but the head of the EPA is required to
establish separate guidelines that treat spills of those kinds of oils
differently than it treats spills of petroleum-type oils.
66
61. See State v. Hazelwood, 866 P.2d 827 (AK 1993).
62. In re Exxon Valdez, 484 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2007).
63. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 492 (2007).
64. 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702 (c) (1). See also id. at (c) (2), (3) (exempting dis-
charges by public vessels, as well as onshore facilities subject to the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651 et seq.).
65. 33 U.S.C.A. § 2701, 23 (2004).
66. 33 U.S.C.A. § 2720 (1995).
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Under OPA 90, owners and operators of seagoing vessels (as well
as oil rigs and other facilities) are held strictly liable for the removal
costs and damages resulting from the oil they discharge into the wa-
ter 67 (unless the discharge was exempt under 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702
(c).) "Damages" include injuries to natural resources, real or per-
sonal property, the subsistence use of natural resources (whether or
not the claimant owns the resources, and regardless of who manages
them,) lost government revenues and/or taxes, lost profits and dimin-
ished earning capacity, and the increased costs of providing public
services during or after removal services.
68
OPA 90 allows a similar set of defenses to those allowed by
CERCLA. The complete defenses under OPA 90 are worded almost
identically to the language used in CERCLA, except that the word
"oil" is used instead of the phrase "hazardous substance." 69 These
defenses do not apply if: the defendant was required by law to report
the oil spill and failed to do so, if the defendant knew or should have
known about the spill; the defendant failed to provide all reasonable
cooperation and assistance requested by the responsible government
official in connection with the removal activities, or if the defendant
fails to comply with a 33 U.S.C.A. 1321 (c) or (e) order, or an order
made pursuant to the Intervention on the High Seas Act, 33 U.S.C.
701471 et seq. 7
The Limitation of Liability Act does not apply to OPA 90bility.71
Much like CERCLA, OPA 90 has its own set of damage caps. But
with regards to specific claimants (apparently even if the claimant is
the Federal government), the defendant is not liable to the extent that
the claimant's own gross negligence or willful misconduct caused
the spill or threatened spill.72 For deepwater ports and any onshore
facilities, the liability cap is $350 million. 73 For all offshore facili-
ties, the cap is $75 million plus the removal costs.74 For non-tank
vessels, the cap is $950 per gross ton of the vessel or $800,000,
67. 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702.
68. 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702 (b) (2) (A)-(F).
69. 33 U.S.C.A. § 2703 (a) compare to 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607 (b).
70. 33 U.S.C.A. § 2703 (c).
71. 33 U.S.C.A. § 2704 (a). ("Except as otherwise provided in this section, the
total liability of a responsible party under § 2702 of this title ... shall not exceed
72. 33 U.S.C.A. § 2703 (b).
73. 33 U.S.C.A. § 2704 (a) (4).
74. Id. at (a) (3).
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whichever is greater. 75 The liability caps for tank vessels are calcu-
lated using a somewhat more complicated formula.
For single-hulled tankers (including ones with double-hulled bot-
toms only, or double-hulled sides only) the cap is the greater of
$3,000 per gross ton of the vessel's weight 76 or $6 million if the ves-
sel weighs fewer than or exactly 3,000 gross tons, or $22 million if
the vessel weighs more than 3,000 gross tons. 77 For multi-hulled
tankers,78 the liability cap is $1,900 per gross ton of the vessel's
weight 79 or $4 million if the tanker weighs less than or exactly 3,000
gross tons, or $16 million if the tanker weighs more than 3,000 gross
tons.80 These caps don't apply in circumstances where the defendant
would be barred from raising any 33 U.S.C.A. § 2703 (a) defenses
by 33 U.S.C.A. § 2703 (c), 1 when the defendant operator, or his
employee, or agent, or a party acting pursuant to a contract with the
defendant, unless that party was a common carrier by rail and the
sole contractual arrangement involved was between them, and the
spill or threatened spill arose in connection with that contract,
proximately causes the spill or threatened spill through his gross
negligence or willful misconduct, or when the defendant operator
has violated an applicable federal safety, operating or construction
regulation;82 or to certain other defendants. 
83
III. THE MODERN TREND TOWARDS ENVIRONMENTAL LLABIUTY
SALVAGE
A. Historical Legal Background- Non-Property Salvage
The law of salvage is meant to provide an incentive for ships and
their crews to protect the property of others, and to discourage them
75. Id. at (a) (2).
76. Id. at (a) (1) (A).
77. Id. at (a) (1) (C).
78. The drafter of this provision appears to have anticipated the possibility of
oil tankers being built with more than two layers of material between the oil inside
the tanker, and the water outside of it. Such tankers would not be treated as sin-
gle-hulled tankers.
79. 33 U.S.C.A. § 2704 (a) (1) (B).
80. Id. at (a) (1) (C).
81. Id. at (c). Compare 33 U.S.C.A. § 2704 (c) (2) with 33 U.S.C.A.§ 2703
(c).
82. 33 U.S.C.A. § 2704 (c) (1).
83. Id. at (c) (3) - (4).
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from embezzling the property after successfully protecting it. 84 The
value of the property that was saved by the salvager is arguably the
most important element amongst the Blackwall factors, 85 as the pur-
pose of salvage law is to encourage the preservation of properties
that are subject to marine perils. Blackwall also seemed to believe
that salvage law was meant to encourage the saving of lives,86 but at
the time that decision was handed down, (1869) the idea that tortfea-
sors could be held liable to the families of those killed by their torts
was still very new to the common law world.87 Because the shi-
powner could not be liable to one of his seamen if he had perished,
he didn't receive any financial benefit from the salvager if only lives
were saved, and no property; (at least, not under federal law, until
1920.)88 The traditional, formalistic reason for not allowing a de-
ceased seaman's family to recover (or any deceased tort victim's
family, for that matter) was that the plaintiffs claim was personal to
him, and could not survive after his death. 89 However, the power of
this harsh common law rule began to wane when the Parliament of
84. Blackwall, 77 U.S. at 14. See also R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. The Wrecked
and Abandoned Vessel, 435 F.3d 521, 531 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting that "without
some promise of remuneration, salvors might understandably be reluctant to un-
dertake the often dangerous and costly efforts necessary to provide others with
assistance.").
85. See Margate Shipping Co. v. The MV J.A. Orgeron (The Cherry Valley),
143 F.3d 976, 987 (5th Cir. 1998) (commenting that the value of the property
saved is "clearly one of the most important of the Blackwall factors, and must be
accorded substantial deference in the calculation of any award.").
86. Blackwall, 77 U.S. at 14 (stating that "[c]ompensation as salvage is not
viewed by the admiralty courts merely as pay ... but as a reward given for perilous
services, voluntarily rendered, and as an inducement to seamen and others to em-
bark in such undertakings to save life and property."), (Italics supplied).
87. See Lord Campbell's Act, 9 & 10 Vic. c.93 (1846).
88. Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768.
89. The Highland Light, (Chase 150), 12 F. Cas. 138, 139 (C.C. Md. 1867)
(No. 6477) (discussing the origins of Lord Campbell's Act and the traditional rea-
son for not allowing wrongful death actions. Also holding that Maryland's
broadly worded wrongful death statute could not sustain an action in rem against
the ship upon which the death occurred.); compare to McDonald v. Mallory, 77
N.Y. 546 (1879) (holding that New York's broadly worded wrongful death statute,
which spoke in general terms, allowed a wrongful death action to be brought in
personam against the shipowner in New York state court, by the family of a sea-
man whose death (on the high seas) was allegedly caused by his employer's negli-
gently loaded petroleum cargo, at least in cases where the vessel was registered in
and hailed from a New York port, the tortfeasor and seaman were both citizens of
New York, and the seaman had been employed by a New York company).
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the United Kingdom passed Lord Campbell's Act 9° in 1846; by 1970
every U.S. state had enacted a wrongful death statute. 91 (Also, in
1970, the Supreme Court held that wrongful death claims could be
brought under general maritime law, in cases where the death was
caused by the violation of maritime duties.)92
When the old common law rule forbidding wrongful death claims
was dominant, the notion that pure life salvages were not com-
pensable might have found justification in economics. If the shi-
powner could not be held liable for the deaths of his crew, he would
receive no financial benefit from the saving of their lives. If the shi-
powner has not received any financial benefit from the salvage ser-
vice, why should he have to pay for it? Another possible justifica-
tion for the courts' refusal to allow pure life salvage awards might
have been the notion that sailors would not need any monetary in-
centives to save the lives of fellow seamen; they would do so with or
without rewards. But when modem courts deal with pure life sal-
vages, they may be willing to allow the life salvor to recover his ex-
penses; at least where the salvor and defendant seem to have agreed,
before the life salvage was attempted, that the salvor would be com-
pensated for his efforts.
93
Formerly, the damages caused by the collision of two ships would
be shared equally by the owners of the two ships, 94 but if only one
ship was at fault for the collision, he would have to bear all of those
losses.95 Of course, the Limitation of Liability Act would allow a
90. Lord Campbell's Act, 9 & 10 Vic. c.93 (1846).
91. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 90 S. Ct. 1772, 26 L.
Ed. 2d 399, 1970 AMC 967 (1970) (stating that "in the United States, every State
today has enacted a wrongful death statute.").
92. Id. (Overruling The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 213, 7 S. Ct. 140, 30 L. Ed.
358 (1886) and holding that "an action does lie under general maritime law for
death caused by violation of maritime duties.").
93. See Peninsular & Oriental Steam Nav. Co. v. Overseas Oil Carriers, Inc.,
553 F.2d 830, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 859, 98 S. Ct. 183, n. 9 (1977).
94. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. 125 (1874) (holding that where both ships were
at fault, the owners of each ship must pay half of the total damage.). However, the
modem rule is that damages are apportioned between the parties to a collision
based on their fault. See Reliable Transfer v. United States, 421 U.S. 397 (1975)
(establishing the modem rule of proportional fault that is used in maritime colli-
sions today, and overruling The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17
How.) 170 (1885)).
95. The Clara, 102 U.S. 200, 26 L. Ed. 145 (1880) (holding that "where the
fault is wholly on one side, the party in fault must bear his own loss, and compen-
sate the other party, if such party have (sic) sustained any damage.").
2009]
284 FORDHAMENVIRONMENTAL LA WREVIEW
shipowner to avoid having to pay damages to another ship if his own
ship was destroyed (if it were successfully invoked.) In the 19th
century, when ships and their cargo were damaged or destroyed,
there was little to no long-term environmental threat. Although there
could be dramatic political and economic repercussions when ships
carrying large amounts of gold sank, there were no concerns about
pollution. Consequently, parties who did not own ships or cargo
(and who were not on either vessel) were generally not directly hurt
by shipwrecks. An exception might be if another ship crashed into
the wrecked ship.
But in the modem world, if an oil tanker or a vessel carrying haz-
ardous substances crashes, it can have dire consequences not only
for the shipowners, their crews, and the cargo owners; but also for
other parties who rely on the waters. 96 The marine world is a major
(sometimes primary) source of food for many of people, who may
suffer tremendously if they are unable to fish, or eat contaminated
seafood. The modem American statutes seem to suggest that Con-
gress was aware of the far-reaching negative consequences of dis-
charges of oils and hazardous substances into the water. Shipowners
and cargo owners enter into voluntary contracts with each other, so
in that context, the Limitation of Liability Act seems less draconian.
But it seems much more unfair when the shipowner limits his liabil-
ity against an unrelated third party, and especially when the liability
is for pollution cleanup costs. Accordingly, Congress refuses to al-
low the Limitation of Liability Act to apply when the vessel makes a
release or threatened release of "oil" or "hazardous substances."
97
Should a salvager be rewarded for successfully protecting a shi-
powner from this liability? Unrelated parties benefit more from the
waters being (relatively) free of oil and hazardous substances, so
why should the shipowner have to pay the salvager for helping these
other people? The shipowner should have to pay the salvager be-
cause CERCLA and OPA 90 would have made him responsible for
the cleanup costs, if they had occurred. Salvagers should not be able
to recover for preserving the economic status quo of third parties
(who would have been harmed by the oil or chemical spill;) rather,
salvagers should be able to recover based on the liability that the
shipowner would have incurred under CERCLA or OPA 90 if the
salvager had not prevented the spill.
96. See infra Louisiana v. MV Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985).
97. See 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2761; 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601 - 9675.
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International treaties and the contracts commonly used in salvage
operations have slowly begun to provide salvagers with incentives to
prevent environmental damage. However, it seems that these
agreements and contracts seek to reward salvagers to encourage the
socially useful behavior of preventing or minimizing damage to the
environment; not because the recipient of the salvage services have
been spared from the liability environmental statutes.
B. International Conventions on Salvage Law and The Salvage
Act
98
Over the last hundred years, the international community seems to
have begun to realize that the mechanics of the old Anglo-American
salvage law do not adequately encourage salvagers to avert oil and
hazardous substance spills. In the early 20th century, many impor-
tant maritime nations decided to unify their salvage laws by treaty.
So in 1910, they signed the Brussels Convention on the Unification
of Certain Rules with Respect to Assistance and Salvage at Sea 99
("1910 Convention"), which had been drafted by the Comit6 Mari-
time International; ("CMI") and came into effect in 1913.
The U.S. formally bound itself to its signature of the 1910 Conven-
tion in 1911, and in 1912 Congress passed what is commonly known
as the Salvage Act l to make its domestic law consistent with the
terms of the treaty. 01 The international trend towards a more uni-
fied salvage law was a very important development, even though the
1910 Convention was superseded by a successor treaty.
In 1981, the CMI created a new salvage draft that was modified by
the International Maritime Organization, and after considerable
changes, became the International Convention on Salvage, 1989
("1989 Convention") which was ratified by the U.S., and came into
98. Act of Aug. 1, 1912, ch. 268, 37 Stat. 242, 46 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 727-730,
as amended [hereinafter The Salvage Act].
99. See Healy, supra note 36 at 746, n. 39. "The 1910 Convention entered into
force Mar. 1, 1913. The official French text appears at 37 Stat. 1658, and the U.S.
English text appears at 37 Stat. 1670 and as T.S. No 576. The U.S. English trans-
lation is Appendix B to M. Norris, The Law of Salvage (Norris), which constitutes
v. 3A of Benedict on Admiralty. The U.K. English translation is Appendix 2 to G.
Brice, The Maritime Law of Salvage (2d ed. 1993)."
100. The Salvage Act, supra note 98, 46 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 727-730, as
amended.
101. See Healy, supra note 36 at 746-47.
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force in 1996.102 This treaty now applies to essentially all salvage
cases brought before American courts.10 3  The 1989 Convention
modifies the traditional "no cure-no pay" rule with respect to envi-
ronmental salvage efforts. 1
04
Article 14 of the 1989 Convention guarantees a salvor the recovery
of his expenses if he makes a failed attempt to prevent a vessel or its
cargo from damaging the environment, or if his attempt fails to
minimize the environmental damage. If a salvor succeeds in pre-
venting or minimizing the environmental damage, the tribunal decid-
ing the matter can reward him by awarding him up to twice his ex-
penses, if this amount exceeds the compensation he would have re-
ceived under Article 13.105 It is important to note that an Article 14
environmental salvage award, unlike an Article 13 award, is not lim-
ited by the value of the salvaged property. 10 6 A hypothetical situa-
tion may help illustrate how Article 14 helps promote environmental
protection.
Suppose that there is a very old, poorly maintained oil tanker, and
that her captain pilots her in such a way that she ends up being
wedged between two very large rock formations, and that she begins
to leak her oil. Several tugboats, owned separately by independent
subsidiaries of a larger company, happen to be nearby. As luck
would have it, they are equipped with booms and other equipment
designed to contain spilled oil. However, the tugs' owner knows
that the tanker is very old, and is probably worthless because of the
damage it has just sustained. If a strict "no cure-no pay" framework
were in place, the owner of the tugs would not have an economic
incentive to try to contain the oil spill, assuming that the measures
taken to contain the spill would also render the oil unfit for resale.
Article 14, on the other hand, enables the owner to recover his rea-
sonable expenses, and perhaps even earn a small profit of up to 30%
if he fails and up to twice his expenses if the tribunal feels it fair and
just to do so in light of the Article 13 factors. 107 However, because
102. Id. See also Nicolas J.J. Gaskell, The 1989 Salvage Convention and the
Lloyd's Open Form (LOF} Salvage Agreement 1990, 16 Tul. Mar. L. J. 1, 77-90
(1991) (transcribing the English language version of the 1989 Salvage Conven-
tion).
103. For the exceptions, see id at 748.
104. Id. at 747.
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"expenses" only include direct expenses, and not overhead, and the
opportunity cost of keeping resources at the ready when they could
be earning money elsewhere,108 it would probably not be economi-
cally viable to keep such vessels and their crews at the ready.
C Background Information Regarding Lloyd's Open Forms
Most modern salvage operations happen pursuant to contracts be-
tween the salvager and the salvagee. When a vessel is faced with a
maritime peril, its master is usually in a poor position to negotiate
for the salvage of his ship. On the one hand, he has a duty not to
agree to a contract that would waste the owner's money, but on the
other hand, the vessel, her crew, and/or her cargo could all be de-
stroyed if the salvager is not persuaded to give his assistance.
The Lloyd's Standard Form of Salvage Agreement ("Lloyd's Open
Form") is the most commonly used contract in salvage cases, 1°9 and
specifies that English law (most importantly, English salvage and
contract law) will govern the agreement, 110 regardless of whether
either of the contracting parties has any other connections to Eng-
land, or any other part of the United Kingdom. The salvage is still
considered pure salvage, as opposed to contract salvage, because
these contracts do not specify a particular amount of compensation,
which is left "open.""' Parliament has incorporated the text of the
1989 Salvage Convention into English salvage law by statute. 12
Using Lloyd's Open Form has benefits for both the salvager and
the salvagee. The salvager is benefited because the contract will not
be vulnerable to accusations that it was made under duress, or that it
will be voided for unconscionability. If the salvager requested a
specific amount of compensation, his strong bargaining position
could make the owner feel as though he has no choice but to accept
the proposal, no matter how unfair it is. The salvagee is helped be-
108. See infra Semco Salvage & Marine Pte. Lt. v. Lancer Nav. Co. Ltd., (The
Nagasaki Spirit), 1 Lloyd's L. Rep. 323, 1997 AMC 1989 (House of Lords, 1997).
109. Liza J. Bowman, Oceans Apart Over Sunken Ships: Is the Underwater
Cultural Heritage Convention Really Wrecking Admiralty Law?, 42 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 1, 5, n. 14 (2004) ("Lloyd's Open Form (LOF) is the most common form of
salvage contract in use around the world.").
110. See Healy supra note 36 at 749-50.
111. Although Lloyd's Open Form agreements are contractual in nature, they
are still result in "pure" as opposed to "contract" salvages. Id.
112. See The Merchant Shipping (Salvage and Pollution) Act 1994, § I(1), Acts
1994, ch. 68, adopts the 1989 Convention as Sched. 1.
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cause he will not have to try to persuade a court that the contract
should be voided for duress or unconscionability.
Lloyd's Open Form has been used for over a hundred years, and its
terms are periodically revised by the Council of Lloyd's. The 1980
version of Lloyd's Open Form included a new and radical provision,
one which abrogated the traditional Anglo-American "no cure-no
pay" rule. Under this version, if a salvage attempt failed or was only
partially successful, the intended beneficiary of the failed services
would still have to reimburse the salvager for his reasonable ex-
penses, and potentially have to pay an additional amount of up to
15% of those reasonable expenses." 3
D. Lloyd's Open Form 2000114 and the SCOPIC Clause"15
Lloyd's Open Form 2000 gives salvagers the ability to invoke the
Special Compensation by P & I Clubs ("SCOPIC") clause, which
incorporates Article 14 of the 1989 Salvage Convention into the
agreement. The SCOPIC clause changes the way that the salvager's
award is calculated by using a pricing schedule that specifies a cer-
tain per diem fee for the particular equipment and personnel that
were involved in the salvage operation. A salvager who invokes the
SCOPIC clause receives this award whether or not his salvage at-
tempt succeeded. However, the SCOPIC "clock" only starts running
once the salvager has notified the owner that he is invoking the
SCOPIC clause." 6 This encourages him to invoke the clause early,
or not at all. The SCOPIC rates only apply after the salvager in-
vokes the SCOPIC clause; not retroactively.
However, the tribunal calculating the SCOPIC award will also de-
termine what the award would have been under Article 13 of the
1989 Salvage Convention. In other words, it calculates the award
that the salvager would have received if he had not invoked the
SCOPIC clause. If it turns out that the salvager would have received
more money had he not invoked the SCOPIC clause, the tribunal
will award the salvager 75% of the difference between the two fig-
ures, in addition to the SCOPIC compensation. In calculating the
113. See Healy supra note 36 at 747-50.
114. Lloyd's Open Form 2000, available athttp://www.lloyds.com/Lloyds_
Worldwide/LloydsAgents/SalvageArbitrationBranch/LloydsOpenForm
_LOF.htm.
115. See Healy supra note 36 at 754-56.
116. Id.at755.
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difference, the tribunal will make his calculations as though the
SCOPIC clause was invoked immediately, even 
if it was not. Pt
The SCOPIC clause allows salvagers to guarantee a certain level
of compensation based on the equipment and labor they have used,
and avoid the harshness of the "no cure-no pay" rule. Also, it does
not eliminate the salvager's incentive to succeed; if he does, his re-
ward may be increased. However, if his SCOPIC award is higher
than his Article 13 award would have been, he will not receive a
higher award for being successful. His SCOPIC award will be sup-
plemented by 75% of the Article 13 award, to the extent that it ex-
ceeds his SCOPIC award. 118 Because this is somewhat complicated,
an illustrative hypothetical example is in order.
1. An Illustrative Hypothetical SCOPIC Award
Let us suppose that a tugboat receives a call for help from a yacht,
which has exhausted its supply of fuel and is a fair number of miles
away from the nearest port. They form a Lloyd's Open Form 2000
contract to determine what award, if any, the tugboat will receive.
Also, there are reports that a nearby storm might be moving towards
the stranded yacht within a few days. The tugboat starts towing the
yacht, and one day later the master of the former vessel radios her
owner and tells him that he is unsure as to whether the tug will have
enough fuel to tow it to the nearest port. After hearing that news, the
owner invokes the SCOPIC clause and tells this to the owner of the
yacht, and tells the tug's master to try anyway and hope for the best.
The tug continues to work, and two days later it succeeds. Let us
further suppose that the SCOPIC schedule says that the tug and her
crew are owed $40,000 per diem, that the yacht was worth
$4,000,000 and finally, that it would have been utterly destroyed if
not for the salvager's efforts.
In that hypothetical scenario, the owner of the salvage vessel
would have an $80,000 SCOPIC award; if the salvage effort had
failed after the second and third days of work, he would still receive
that $80,000 award. Next, the tribunal will look at Article 13, in
particular, at the factors provided in Article 13 l(a)-(j). Let us
suppose that the tribunal finds that the salvager would have been
entitled to $2.4 million under Article 13 (note that Article 13, 3
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property.) The tribunal will then subtract $120,000 (the SCOPIC
award that the salvager would have received had he invoked the
SCOPIC clause at the beginning of the contract, rather than on day
two) from the $2.4 million, which leaves $2.28 million. Next, the
tribunal will multiply the $2.28 million by 0.75 and arrive at a figure
of $1.71 million. It will then add that amount to the $80,000
SCOPIC amount and award the salvager a total of $1.79 million for
his services.
E. Environmental Liability Salvage in Modern Era Cases
When Blackwall was decided in 1869, the Supreme Court stated
that salvage awards are meant to encourage ships to come to the aid
of other vessels that are unable to protect themselves. 1 9 This sup-
ports the public policy of minimizing damage to property and the
number of lives lost at sea. As this paper has previously discussed,
shipwrecks in modem times can cause massive economic damage to
those who use the waters and shores for economic purposes. To deal
with this modem reality, Congress passed OPA 90 and CERCLA to
make those who spill oil and hazardous substances (respectively)
responsible, inter alia, for the costs of cleaning up the pollutants,
notwithstanding the Limitation of Liability Act. 12 This section will
look at how courts have responded to the question of whether envi-
ronmental liability salvage should be allowed, both before and after
the applicable environmental law came into effect.
1. Averted Oil Spills Pre-OPA 90 - Allseas Maritime'
21
In Allseas Maritime, S.A. v. M/V Mimosa, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals was asked to increase a salvager's award based on the
liability that the salvager prevented the shipowner from incurring (in
addition to the value of the property that he saved.) In 1979, the MV
Mimosa and the M/V Burma Agate 122 collided in Galveston Bay
119. Blackwall, 77 U.S. at 14.
120. See 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2761; 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675.
121. Allseas Mar., S.A. v. MN Mimosa, 812 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1987).
122. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Texas disagree as to the spelling of this vessel's name.
The district court spells the name of this vessel "Burmah Agate," while the Fifth
Circuit spells it "MN Burma Agate." Allseas Mar., S.A. v. MN Mimosa, 574 F.
Supp. 844 (S.D. TX 1983), affd Allseas Mar., S.A. v. MNMimosa, 812 F.2d
243. For the sake of consistency, this paper uses the Fifth Circuit's spelling.
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(thirty-five members of the M/V Burma Agate's thirty-nine man
crew were killed, as was one member of the M/V Mimosa's crew). 123
The M/V Burma Agate began to leak her fuel, and the M/V Mimosa
caught fire. The surviving members of the M'V Mimosa's crew
dropped her anchor and abandoned ship; failing to turn off her en-
gines, and leaving her under the control of her auto-pilot. The M/V
Mimosa continued to travel through the water like a runaway train,
dragging her anchor behind her. 1
24
The Mimosa's rudder had been turned starboard, so she was travel-
ing in an ever-widening spiral, towards nearby oil rigs and platforms.
The captain of a nearby tugboat, the M/V Taroze Vizier, took action
to prevent the A/V Mimosa from crashing into any of the several oil
rigs that were nearby. He steered his tugboat towards the burning
ship and attempted to stop her by using his ropes and cables to en-
tangle her propeller, although this risked pulling the A/V Tarzoe Vi-
zier into the propeller of the much larger M/V Mimosa. There was
also a very substantial risk that the A/V Mimosa (which was still
aflame) could explode, which would have likely destroyed the A!V
Tarzoe Vizier and killed or seriously injured everyone aboard her.
The tugboat's crew was enveloped by the burning tanker's smoke,
and at one point a lifeboat from the tanker fell onto the M/V Tarzoe
Vizier. 12
5
The effort to entangle the M/V Mimosa's propeller failed. So, the
M/V Tarzoe Vizier and two other tugs instead pushed the M/V Mi-
mosa, altering her course so that she would not crash into the oil rigs
or oil platforms. A fourth tug used her hose to help put out the M/V
Mimosa's fire. After seven and a half hours, the M/V Mimosa's en-
gines finally stopped and the crisis ended. The tugs were able to
recover about $350,000 worth of oil and prevented the M/V Mimosa
from crashing into an oil rig, which probably would have destroyed
her utterly. However, the damage caused by the collision and fire
reduced the M/V Mimosa's value to about $400,000. The /V Tar-
zoe Vizier was worth about $2.6 million.' 26
Despite the heroic efforts of the MV Tarzoe Vizier (and the other
three tugs, which apparently did not claim any salvage awards), she
could not establish that the oil she recovered belonged to the M/V
Mimosa, and was unable to collect a salvage award from the M/V
123. Allseas Mar., S.A. v. M/V Mimosa, 812 F.2d at 245.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 245-46.
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Mimosa's owners for recovering it. The Fifth Circuit also declined
to increase the salvage award based on the liability averted by the
M/V Tarzoe Vizier. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowl-
edged that the M/V Tarzoe Vizier had prevented the M/V Mimosa
from causing millions of dollars in additional damage to any of the
oil rigs that it probably would have crashed into. It also acknowl-
edged that preventing a shipowner from incurring liabilities protects
the shipowner's interests, just as protecting the shipowner's ship
and/or cargo does.127 However, the Fifth Circuit considered the ef-
fects of the Limitation of Liability Act,12 8 and noted that if the A/V
Mimosa had crashed into an oil rig, her value would have been re-
duced to nothing; she could have then limited her liability to that
amount. Therefore, the M/V Tarzoe Vizier did not actually protect
the M/V Mimosa's owners from any liability - the Limitation of Li-
ability Act would have limited the liability to essentially nothing. 129
Accordingly, the M/V Tarzoe Vizier received only a $67,500 award,
for being 25% responsible for preserving the $400,000 value of the
M/V Mimosa post-salvage. 13
0
OPA 90 was not in effect when the events in Allseas Maritime
took place, but today it is. 13 1 If the events in Allseas Maritime took
place post-OPA 90, the Limitation of Liability Act would make the
owner of the M/V Mimosa liable for, inter alia, the cleanup costs of
the oil that surely would have spilled if she had crashed into an oil
rig or an oil platform. The Fifth Circuit seemed to have believed that
it should allow the M/V Tarzoe Vizier to recover for the liability that
she averted, but she didn't avert any liability to the owner of the M/V
Mimosa. The Limitation of Liability Act would have capped the
127. Id. at 247 (holding that there was "considerable merit" to the notion "that
salvors should be compensated for liability avoided.").
128. Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-196 (1851) (current version
at 46 U.S.C. § 3054 (2006)).
129. Unless, of course, a second collision would have killed people on whatever
structure it would have crashed into. The Limitation of Liability Act would
probably consider such a crash a separate event, and make the M/V Mimosa's
owner liable with regards to personal injuries and wrongful death claims, for up to
$420 per gross ton of the MV Mimosa, as defined by the statute. See 46 U.S.C.A.
30504.
130. Allseas Mar. S.A., v. MV Mimosa, 812 F.2d at 246-47.
131. The salvage in this case occurred in 1979, while OPA 90 only applies to
discharges or threatened discharges of oil that occurred after August 18, 1990. See
33 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2761.
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owner's liability to the owner of the oil rig to the value of the M/V
Mimosa, which would have been around $0.
How would the Fifth Circuit have responded if OPA 90 had been
in effect? We cannot say for sure, although it seems that the only
thing that made the court decide not to recognize liability salvage
was the Limitation of Liability Act. Unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit
would not decide another salvage award case until eleven years after
Allseas Maritime.132 That case, which this paper discusses infra, did
deal with the potential release of oil, but it was the salvager that was
at risk of causing an oil spill (and incurring liability under OPA 90.)




In Trico Marine, a Louisiana district court examined Allseas Mari-
time's apparent approval of liability salvage (at least, when limita-
tion of liability could be overcome, as through OPA 90 or
CERCLA). In this case, several barges loaded with benzene were
fastened together. The fastenings came loose and the flotilla broke
apart; realizing the danger, the Coast Guard sent a distress call ask-
ing for help from any nearby vessels who might be able to assist in
recapturing the barges. The plaintiff responded and succeeded in
rounding up the barges, and averting a probable chemical spill. The
salvager requested that the district court consider, in calculating his
salvage award, the CERCLA liability that was averted by his ac-
tions. 1
4
The district court considered whether it would allow liability sal-
vage in the case. It noted that the drafters of the 1989 Convention
rejected the idea of inserting language that would have allowed li-
ability salvage.135 Although the 1989 Convention had been ratified
by the U.S. Senate, it did not go into effect until 1997, when 15 na-
tions had ratified it. The district court noted that the drafters of the
1989 Convention decided not to explicitly permit liability salvage;
132. See Margate Shipping Co. v. The J.A. Orgeron (The Cherry Valley), 143
F.3d 976, 989, n. 14 (5th Cir. 1998).
133. Trico Marine Operators, Inc. v. DOW Chem. Co., 809 F. Supp. 440 (E.D.
LA 1992).
134. Id, at 441.
135. Id. at 443 (citing Nicolas J.J. Gaskell, The 1989 Salvage Convention and
the Lloyd's Open Form (LOF] Salvage Agreement 1990 16 TUL. MAR. L. J. 1, 7 n.
16(1991)).
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they had debated putting in such a provision, but decided not to. The
district court determined that their decision not to explicitly allow
liability salvage was essentially the same thing as them deciding to
insert a provision expressly forbidding liability salvage, and that ac-
cordingly, it would not recognize liability salvage, despite the fact
that the 1989 Convention had not even come into force when the
case was decided. 36 The court's conclusion does not seem war-
ranted. If the drafters intended to forbid liability salvage, they would
have specified this in the 1989 Convention. The lack of any refer-
ence to liability salvage one way or the other actually seems to sug-
gest that among the drafters, the proponents and opponents of liabil-
ity salvage were relatively divided on the issue, and perhaps they
compromised by leaving it for the courts to decide.
The court decided that because both the 1989 Convention and
Lloyd's Open Form 1990 had "rejected" liability salvage, it would
not follow the Allseas Maritime dicta that suggested that liability
salvage would have been appropriate when limitation of liability was
not possible. 137 The Trico Marine court decided to add the Article
14 "skill and efforts of the salvors in preventing or minimizing dam-
age to the environment" consideration to the list of traditional
Blackwall factors. It indicated that it preferred that result because it
would mean that it would not have to try to estimate the amount of
liability that had actually been avoided. 138 The issue of estimating
the averted liability is dealt with infra, in Section III of this note.
3. The Cherry Valley 1
39
In The Cherry Valley, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals again
dealt with the issue of potential environmental liability in salvage
operations, but this time in a very different context from Allseas
Maritime. The Orgeron was a tug that was towing the Poseidon,
which had a tall hanger specially designed to store an external fuel
tank for NASA; the tank had a replacement cost of about $31 mil-
lion, and would have taken about three years to replace. NASA had
136. Trico Marine, 809 F. Supp. 440, 443 (holding that "[i]n light of the rejec-
tion of liability salvage ... the Court will add an additional factor to the Blackwall
list - "skill and efforts of the salvors in preventing or minimizing damage to the
environment.").
137. Id.
138. Id. at 443-444.
139. The Cherry Valley,143 F.3d 976.
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three other tanks of the same kind, but had determined that it pre-
ferred to have at least four tanks on hand. 140  The Orgeron was
bringing the tank from Michoud, Louisiana to the Kennedy Space
Center at Cape Canaveral, Florida. Tropical Storm Gordon started
approaching the Orgeron, but when her captain asked her owner for
permission to seek refuge, he was told to press onward. She lost
engine power about 10 to 18 miles from the shores of Florida and
requested help from the Coast Guard, which was unable to help due
to the storm. 141
The Cherry Valley, an oil tanker carrying about 9 million gallons
of crude oil at the time, arrived and decided to try to help. She ma-
neuvered close to the Orgeron and tried to send the tug messenger
lines. The purpose of sending the messenger lines was to facilitate
the attachment of towing cables, which would allow the Cherry Val-
ley, the oil tanker, to tow the tug to safety.142 After two failed at-
tempts to pass messenger lines, the Cherry Valley successfully
passed hawsers to the Orgeron, which was still attached to the Po-
seidon. The Cherry Valley passed over the tow line between the Or-
geron and the Poseidon, but fortunately the tow line did not entangle
the Cherry Valley's rudder or propeller. 143 While these maneuvers
were taking place, the Orgeron was drifting into waters that were too
shallow for the Cherry Valley to float on; there were only about 10
feet between the Cherry Valley's keel and the bottom. Fortunately,
the Cherry Valley successfully recovered the Orgeron and the Po-
seidon, without destroying or severely damaging herself in the proc-
ess, or spilling any of her oil. 144
When the district court was determining the amount of the salvage
award, it applied the Blackwall factors, one of which looks at the risk
taken by the salvager. The district court noted that the Cherry Valley
took a big risk; not only were lives and the very expensive ship at
stake, but millions of gallons of crude oil could have been spilled if
140. Presumably, NASA preferred to have more than two backup external fuel
tanks. This seems prudent; there are no "do-overs" in rocketry.
141. Id. at 980.
142. Of course, it is quite atypical for an oil tanker to tow a tugboat. It is many
times more common for tugs to tow oil tankers.
143. Coincidentally, the M/V Tarzoe Vizier in Allseas Maritime attempted to
stop the MV Mimosa by entangling her propeller with towing lines. In both All-
seas Maritime and The Cherry Valley, tugs' towing lines almost entangled the
tankers' propellers. Allseas Mar., S.A. v. M'V Mimosa, 812 F.2d at 245; The
Cherry Valley, 143 F.3d at 981.
144. The Cherry Valley, 143 F.3d at 982.
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she had crashed. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the
Cherry Valley was indeed risking more than just herself and her
crew; it held that the risk of environmental liability was "properly
counted" under that factor. 1
45
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court did
not abuse its discretion when, in looking at the Blackwall factors, it
took into account the salvager's risk of being exposed to environ-
mental (OPA 90, in this case) liability. It noted that "in this context,
there is no principled reason to distinguish between the costs im-
posed by the risk of injury or death, and those costs imposed by the
risk of negligence liability or strict environmental damage liability.
All are actual costs to the salvor, and he would presumably be un-
willing to perform the salvage service without their recompense."' 146
This holding by the Fifth Circuit indicates that it still strongly be-
lieves that averted environmental cleanup liabilities (as well as other
averted liabilities) are relevant in salvage awards. 147 In this case,
though, it was the salvager that was at risk of spilling crude oil. One
of the Blackwall factors is the risk that the salvager undertook during
the salvage operation. The owner of the Cherry Valley risked not
only the loss of her ship, cargo, and crew, but also the chance that he
would incur liability under OPA 90. The Fifth Circuit rightly held
that district courts can consider averted environmental liabilities un-
der the traditional Blackwall analysis; if salvage law is to encourage
salvaging, it has to take into account the real considerations weighed
by those involved, including the risk of incurring environmental li-
abilities.
F. Other Recent Developments in Environmental Liability Salvage
1. The Nagasaki Spirit
148
In this case, the House of Lords examined the SCOPIC provision
in Lloyd's Open Form 2000 contracts. Article 14 of the 1989 Con-
145. Id. at 988.
146. Id.
147. See id. (determining that "in this context, there is no principled reason to
distinguish between the costs imposed by the risk of injury or death, and those
costs imposed by the risk of negligence liability or strict environmental damage
liability. All are actual costs to the salvor, and he would presumably be unwilling
to perform the salvage service without their recompense.").
148. Semco Salvage & Marine Pte. Lt. v. Lancer Nav. Co., (The Nagasaki
Spirit), [1997] 1 Lloyd's L. Rep. 323 (H.L.), 1997 AMC 1989.
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vention is important to these contracts, because if the SCOPIC pro-
vision is invoked, that article is read into the contract. 149 Article 14
stipulates that, within the context of the Article, a salvor's "ex-
penses" include his reasonable out-of-pocket expenses as well as "a
'fair rate' for equipment and personnel actually and reasonably used
in the salvage operation, taking into consideration the criteria set out
in art. 13, para. 1(h), (i) and ()." 50 Lord Mustill, writing for the
House of Lords, considered whether the term "fair rate" was meant:
to compensate the salvager for his indirect and overhead expenses;
or a rate that also gives the salvager a substantial profit to reward
him and encourage others to prevent or minimize environmental
damage. 151
Lord Mustill felt that the words of the 1989 Convention made it
clear that the term "fair rate" in Article 14 was not meant to give
salvagers profits. The phrase "fair rate for equipment and person-
nel" is considered part of the Article's definition of the "salvor's
expenses." 152 It would seem to do violence to the language of Arti-
cle 14 to interpret expenses to include a salvor's "expenses and a
profit incentive." Rather, the phrase "fair rate for equipment and
personnel" seems to contemplate that the salvager is meant to re-
cover his direct expenses, as well as his overhead expenses. It seems
that Lord Mustill's interpretation of this phrase in the 1989 Conven-
tion was quite right, but unfortunately, under this interpretation sal-
vagers will essentially "break even" because they will only be recov-
ering their expenses, roughly. Article 14 is not meant to encourage
environmental salvage; it merely seeks to stop discouraging it, as
Article 13 would when the imperiled vessel has little to no value.
Although Article 14 doesn't allow a profit element in its "fair
rate," Lloyd's Open Form 2000's tariff rates do offer salvagers a
chance to earn a profit. 153 However, these profits scale with the
rates on its schedule of rates, not with the liability averted. This
means that preventing $100 million in oil spill liabilities will proba-
bly result in a far lower salvage award than the salvager would gen-
erally get for saving $100 million in property, since the award will
149. See Healy, supra note 36 at 754-56.
150. See art. 14, International Convention on Salvage (1989), available at
http://www.jus.uio.no/ln/imo.salvage.convention. 1989/doc.html#6 1.
151. The Nagasaki Spirit, 1 Lloyd's L. Rep. 323.
152. Id.
153. Healy, supra note 36, at 754.
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be based on the resources used by the salvager, as opposed to the
economic value of his salvaging activity.
While it is a step in the right direction, Lloyd's Open Form 2000
simply doesn't do enough to encourage salvagers to keep vessels
properly equipped at the ready to respond to environmental emer-
gencies. And neither does Article 14, which only allows the sal-
vager to recover based on the people and property he uses during the
salvage operation 5 4 - it does compensate him for keeping salvage
ships constantly at the ready, because it doesn't take into account the
professional salvager's downtime. It is important for the law to en-
courage professional salvagers, because they will tend to be better
equipped and trained to respond to crises than random passers-by.
2. Conclusion Regarding Environmental Liability Salvage
The 1989 Convention and Lloyd's Open Form 2000 both evidence
the growing international understanding that the ancient salvage
rules of the past need to be changed somewhat if they are to encour-
age the protection of our marine and coastal resources. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals came close to recognizing environmental
liability salvage in its 1987 Allseas Maritime decision,155 but the
Limitation of Liability Act prevented it from formally reaching the
question. When the Fifth Circuit decided its next salvage award
case, The Cherry Valley, it reaffirmed the notion that salvage awards
should consider not just the property that could have been destroyed,
but also the liability that could have been created. 156
As the Fifth Circuit pointed out in The Cherry Valley, Blackwall
(which was decided in 1869) is the most recent time that the Su-
preme Court weighed in on the factors that courts should look to
154. See The Nagasaki Spirit, 1 Lloyd's L. Rep. 323.
155. Allseas Maritime, 812 F.2d at 247 (stating that "there is considerable merit,
nonetheless, in the position that salvors should be compensated for liability
avoided. Whether the salvor protects a shipowner's vessel or his other assets, the
economic benefits are equally valuable.").
156. The Cherry Valley, 143 F.3d at 988 (stating that "[i]n this context, there is
no principled reason to distinguish between the costs imposed by the risk of injury
or death, and those costs imposed by the risk of negligence liability or strict envi-
ronmental damage liability. All are actual costs to the salvor, and he would pre-
sumably be unwilling to perform the salvage service without their recompense.
For this reason, the risk of environmental liability was properly counted under the
rubric of the fourth factor.").
[VOL. XX
ENVIRONMENTAL SAL VA GE LA W
when computing salvage awards.' 57  Despite its age, Blackwall's
dicta about the purpose of salvage law seem to support the notion
that the law should motivate salvagers by rewarding them for pro-
tecting others and their property.' 
58
When wooden sailing ships, and even when the coal-powered
steamships sank, the long-term environmental damage caused was
quite generally insignificant. Consequently, the main economic in-
terests threatened by collisions and other causes of damage to ships
and their cargo were of the shipowners and the cargo-owners. The
Limitation of Liability Act was, in effect, a law that was designed to
subsidize shipowners and shipbuilders at the expense of cargo own-
ers, 159 so that more Americans would invest in new ships. 160
In a world where the Limitation of Liability Act could apply to es-
sentially any liability relating to a shipowner's ship, the Blackwall
factors took into account all of the real financial considerations; the
shipowner generally wouldn't be liable for more than the value of
his ship, so the appropriate salvage award would virtually always be
lower than that amount. But because Congress specified that the
liabilities arising out of OPA 90 and CERCLA actions are not sub-
ject to the Limitation of Liability Act, 16 1 there is no reason to arbi-
trarily limit a salvager's award by the value of the property he recov-
ers - not when he has caused that property's owner to avoid enor-
mous liability under one of those statutes.
When an oil tanker is at risk of spilling her cargo, the "real" risk to
the owner is not that his tanker will be damaged or destroyed. The
owner, if he has any sense at all, is much more concerned about be-
ing hit by a tidal wave of OPA 90 liability. The Limitation of Liabil-
ity Act will not be able to help him, 162 and insurance policies don't
157. Id. at 983, n. 8. (pointing out that Blackwall "contains the most recent bit
of guidance that the Supreme Court has deigned to give on the subject of the cal-
culation of salvage awards.").
158. Blackwall at 14 (stating that "[p]ublic policy encourages the hardy and
adventurous mariner to engage in these laborious and sometimes dangerous enter-
prises, and with a view to withdraw from him every temptation to embezzlement
and dishonesty, the law allows him, in case he is successful, a liberal compensa-
tion.").
159. See generally, Sweeney, supra note 24.
160. See id at 259-60 (quoting Senators Dickinson (Dem., N.Y.) and Rantoul
(Dem. Mass.), Cong. Globe, 31st Cong. 2d Sess. 322 at 716-17 (1851)).
161. See supra at notes 51 and 71.
162. See id.
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provide unlimited coverage. 163 If the law will reward a prospective
salvager only for helping to preserve the value of the oil tanker, it is,
in effect, asking him to risk life, limb, and fortune to protect the
owner from the potential OPA 90 liability for nothing. Blackwall
clearly stated that the law does not expect a would-be salvager to
protect another solely out of the goodness of his heart; it promises
him a "liberal compensation" for doing what is right.' 64 In the 19th
century, the courts did not hesitate to award salvagers liberal com-
pensation for saving cargo from the seas. In the 21st century, they
should also award them liberal compensation for saving the seas
from cargo.
IV. METHODS FOR CALCULATING AN ENVIRONMENTAL SALVAGE
AWARD
Courts have struggled in their efforts to define the scope of the
damages that can be attributed to an oil or chemical spill. In Louisi-
ana v. M/V Testbank,165 the Fifth Circuit had to decide the extent to
which the economic costs of a chemical spill would have to be borne
by the responsible party. The events giving rise to the case hap-
pened in the Mississippi River Gulf outlet, where a bulk carrier, the
M/V Sea Daniel, and a container ship, the M'V Testbank collided.
Several of the Testbank's containers fell overboard, spilling their
contents, about 24,000 pounds of pentachlorophenol, ("PCP") into
the water. The authorities suspended navigation in the outlet for
almost three weeks, and fishing, shrimping and related activities
were also supended in 400 square miles of surrounding marsh and
waterways.'16?
M/V Testbank brings to light the difficulties in line-drawing that
often arise in cases where the defendant has done a massive amount
of damage. Of course, in that case, the court was dealing with the
question of which injured parties should be allowed to recover, as
163. And even if the insurance policy is "only" for a few tens or hundreds of
millions of dollars, the insurer is virtually certain to argue that the policy doesn't
apply in the particular circumstances of the spill. It can take years of litigation for
the insured to collect on the policy, if he ever does. The insured may end up feel-
ing compelled to settle for considerably less than the coverage amount he expected
when he bought the policy.
164. Blackwall, 77 U.S. at 14.




opposed to what the cleanup costs are or would have been. But at
least in that case, the court had the benefit of being able to look at
actual claims of damage brought by real plaintiffs. If a court tried to
calculate the amount of liability for cleanup costs that a salvager
averted, its calculations would be extremely speculative. If the spill
hasn't happened, how would we know what the cleanup costs would
have been? The following subsections will examine several possible
ways to deal with the critical problem of setting the proper salvage
award.
A. Hear Expert Testimony on the Amount ofAverted Liability
One potential solution would be to treat this as any other question
of fact. Juries and courts are frequently asked to estimate, for exam-
ple, the amount of medical expenses that an asbestos plaintiff is
likely to incur over the rest of his life. Is it much different to ask
courts to determine what the salvage defendant would have had to
pay to clean up the oil or chemical spill, if it had happened?
When courts have to determine a successful plaintiffs future
medical expenses that he will have to pay as a result of the tort
against him, each side can hire expert witnesses (generally physi-
cians) to testify as to what those future medical expenses will be. As
required under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc., a (federal) dis-
trict court "must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evi-
dence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." 167 This helps to
minimize the chances that the finder of fact (particularly if it is a
jury; though in salvage cases there would not be a jury), will be in-
fluenced by irrelevant and/or unreliable scientific testimony or evi-
dence which they might otherwise tend to believe, as scientists and
doctors are highly respected and trusted by many Americans. Of
course, during cross-examination, each side can challenge the other's
witness. The cross-examination process can reveal flaws in an ex-
pert's testimony and undermine its credibility.
But when one is trying to estimate environmental cleanup costs, it
doesn't seem as though one could obtain very reliable scientific evi-
dence or testimony in most instances. Both parties would probably
try to introduce the testimony of hydrodynamicists; the plaintiff sal-
vager's expert would likely testify that a large percentage of the
tanker's oil would have spilled, while the defendant's expert would
167. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 113 S. Ct. 2786,
2795 (1993).
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probably testify that the spill would have been much smaller. In this
type of situation, it would probably be very difficult to determine
whether the testimony is reliable. Large oil spills occur relatively
infrequently, and the oil spills probably tend to spread significantly
before scientists would have been able to study how and why it
spread the way it did. In contrast to medical evidence or testimony,
where there are often many well-researched studies, predicting the
extent of a hypothetical oil spill would involve a lot of speculation;
probably enough to make the testimony unreliable. And while doc-
tors may be able to give rough estimates of a plaintiffs probable
future medical expenses, estimating the cleanup costs of an oil spill
is an entirely different matter.
If one looked at the cleanup costs of prior oil spills and adjusted
them upwards for inflation, that still wouldn't be likely to provide a
reliable estimate of the expenses. Even if the past oil spill was of the
same amount of oil, the cleanup costs would not necessarily be at all
comparable. Firstly, there are many different types of oil, each with
a different weight, composition etc. Different kinds of oil do not
necessarily spread at the same speed; heavier oils tend not to spread
as quickly, and may sink under the water, while lighter oils tend to
float on the water's surface and spread over large areas. Also, one
would have to take into account how far the oil spill was from those
with the capabilities to clean it. An oil spill near a remote archipel-
ago would probably require very significant logistical expenses, but
an oil spill very close to cleaning equipment would be much cheaper
in that regard. Also, new technologies can drastically affect the
costs of cleaning oil. If a significant new technology did not exist
when the prior oil spill occurred, then the costs of cleaning that oil
spill might have been much more expensive or possibly cheaper
back then. The cleanup costs could have been more expensive in the
past if a newer, cheaper, and more efficient technology were devel-
oped since then to fight oil spills. Or oil spills could have been less
expensive to clean in the past, if the new technology minimizes envi-
ronmental damage, but is much more expensive to use or produce.
Yet another complicating factor would be the fact that not all
beaches are equally difficult to clean. Coarse sand, grainy sand, and
fine sand are not equally difficult to clean oil from. Also, for exam-
ple, the effects of the tides in the Amoco Cadiz oil spill probably in-
fluenced how much of the oil contaminated the beaches of Brittany
as opposed to the water. If the tides and/or currents and/or wind had
moved more of the spilled oil onto the beaches, it might have been
much more expensive to clean the oil (assuming that it is more ex-
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pensive to clean oil from beaches than from the water.) Thus, all of
these concerns suggest that district courts would not be well-suited
to estimate the cleanup costs of averted spills.
B. Fixed Amount per Unit of Chemical / Oil
If a statute specified that the owner of the vessel that caused the
spill is liable for $100 per barrel of oil spilled, the district court
would only have to determine how many barrels would have been
spilled if the salvager had not intervened. The court would not need
to hear evidence as to how much the oil would have cost to clean up,
only evidence as to how much oil would have spilled. This would
require far less speculation from the experts; the maximum amount
would have been the per unit rate multiplied by the total amount of
oil or chemicals that could have spilled. But this would still leave
many significant problems unsolved.
Although there are collision experts who can look at a damaged
ship and make educated guesses as to exactly how that damage oc-
curred, their predictions as to how much oil or chemical would have
spilled would probably be based more on speculation than on scien-
tific principles. And unfortunately, all of the concerns about estimat-
ing the quantity of oil spilled that were discussed supra would still
leave the district court with little to no reliable evidence on which to
make his decision. Thus, this option also seems unsatisfactory.
C. Base Liability Upon Vessel's Characteristics
A better solution might be to consider the characteristics of the
vessel in question. Congress did something similar to this when it
established liability caps for OPA 90 liability.' 68 Congress could
assign a presumptive cleanup liability amount per gross ton of a
tanker. To reflect the reduced risk of oil spills that is associated with
double-hulled ships, Congress could establish a lower per gross ton
multiplier for such tankers. And this multiplier could itself be mul-
tiplied by how full the tanker was - if it was carrying a half-load of
crude oil, the per gross ton multiplier might be halved as well.
Tankers that were overloaded (filled beyond the amount that they
were designed to transport safely), might have a higher multiplier.
For example, 2% higher per gross ton if the tanker was carrying 2%
more oil than the tanker was designed to safely accommodate.
168. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(c); 33 U.S.C.A. § 2704(a).
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Then, the court would have a relatively easy-to-calculate value to
work with. It could then apply the traditional Blackwall-like
169
analysis of Article 13 of the 1989 Convention and apportion the
value of the liability prevented according to the same principals that
are used to share the value of salvaged property between their owner
and their salvor. If the Article 13 factors militate in favor of a small
salvage award, the court could simply award the salvager a small
portion of this liability averted. This solution would be much easier
to implement than creating an entire federal agency, or a special de-
partment within an existing agency, to estimate the cleanup costs
that the salvager has rendered unnecessary, as has been suggested by
at least one scholar. 1
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There would be a few problems with this solution, however.
Firstly, it would require Congress to take action, or a new salvage
convention. Unfortunately, we might have to wait for more prevent-
able oil or chemical spills to happen before Congressional interest
would be sufficiently piqued to make passing such a law a priority.
Also, the setting of the "per gross ton" dollar amounts would be
fraught with controversy. All things considered, however, this pro-
posal appears to strike a very good balance between making the
award reasonably easy for courts to calculate, and making the award
have a good connection to reality. For example, assigning a lower
multiplier for double-hulled ships would reflect their general ten-
dency to spill less oil than their single-hulled cousins. It would also
allow the courts to continue to use the Blackwall doctrine, which is
something with which they are probably comfortable. And most
importantly, it would provide the proper financial incentives to en-
courage salvagers to prevent catastrophic oil and chemical spills.
169. Blackwall, 77 U.S. at 14.
170. Note, Calculating and Allocating Salvage Liability, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1896,
1915, 1916 (1986).
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